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1 iNTRODUCTION
Recently there haz been worldwide interest in examining the scope for greater monetary policy
autonomy for the central bank. At the EC-summit in Maastricht in December 1991 a Treaty on
European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) waz agreed upon. According to this treaty, in
the final stage of EMU - i.e. by 1997 or later - the European Central Bank is supposed to assume
unlimited responsibility for monetary policy. Broadly speaking the accepted Statute guarantees a
central bank as independent from national and European political institutions as the Bundesbank.
Furthermore, in the Pacific Basin Countries the same tendency can be discerned. Since the end of
1989 governor Mieno strengthened the position of the Bank of Japan with respect to the Ministry
of Finance, while New Zealand enacted legislation in February 1990 that increased the indepen-
dence of its Reserve Bank. Finally, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland have been considering
proposals concerning central bank independence.'
The theoretical rationale for central bank independence finds its origin in the ongoing 'Rules
versus Discretion' debate. As Rogoff (1985) notes, dynamic inconsistency theories of inflation of
the Barro-Gordon (1983) type, make it plausible that countries with independent central banks
have a lower sustainable rate of inflation.
Unlike the well~eveloped theoretical literature, there are only a few studies that compare actual
monetary regimes between a large number of countries.2 The most comprehensive studies are
Fair (1980), Bade and Parkin (1988), Alesina (1988, 1989), Alesina and Summers (1990) and
Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991). Focusing on more recent studies, it is striking that the
conclusions of the latter are less robust than the theoretical literature. This is because nearly all of
them - e.g. the well-known inverse relationship between independence and the level of inflation
found by Alesina (1988, 1989) - are stated in terms of correlations between indices of central bank
independence and macro-variables (output, inflation). Therefore, these results are particulazly
sensitive to the numerical values of indices.
This paper compares the major indices of central bank independence as presented in Bade and
Parkin (1988), Alesina (1988, 1989) and Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991). Such a
comparison does not yet exist in the literature. We focus on three aspects: (a) is the index based
on the best possible interpretation of the central bank law within the context of monetary policy
making?' (b) is the index consistent in using all relevant criteria in determining the independence
of each central bank? (c) are the indices of the various authors different or not?
In order to answer the questions mentioned above, the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2
we analyse the competence of central banks on the basis of central bank laws within the context of
monetary policy making. Twelve industrial countries are examined: Australia, Belgium, Canada,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the United States, Sweden
and Switzerland. We describe the central bank laws of these countries focusing on three areas: (i)
relationships between central banks and government in the formulation of monetary policy, (ii)
procedures for appointing the board of the central bank, and (iii) formal responsibilities (objecti-
ves) of the central bank with respect to monetary policy. The existing indices are critically
examined in Section 3. Finally, on the basis of the institutional information provided in section 2,
in Section 4 we construct our 'own' indez of central bank independence and compare our findings
with the literature.z
2 CENTRAL BANK LAw'S
2.1 Sweden
Established in 1668, the Sveriges Riksbank is the oldest central bank in the world. Although this
central bank is legally independent of the government, it is not in practice. The legal base for the
policy making by the Riksbank is the Sveriges Riksbank Act ('Lag f6r Sveriges Riksbank') of
1934.` The Act provides no specific objectives for the central bank, like in other countries.
ln practice, monetazy policy is a part of the economic policy of the government and fits into this
`...to quite the same degree as where this obligation has been given a legal basis'.' According to
Article 1 of the Act, the Riksbank is directly subordinated to the Riksdag (pazliament) and
formally independent. FuRhermore, Article 32 states the following: 'The Directors may not
receive instructions with regard to the administration of the Riksbank from anyone except the
Riksdag and its Banking Committee in cases in which that Committee is competent to give
instructions on behalf of the Riksdag...'.
In addition to this Act, the Riksdag approved special regulations, such as the Credit Policy
Instruments Act of l974, in which '...a government authorization is required before the Riksbank
may exercise its powers'." Thus, the policy making by the Riksbank is inFluenced considerably by
the government through these special regulations, in panicular by the Ministry of Finance and
Economics.'
The Board of Directors ('Bankofullmïktige') of the Riksbank has eight members, of which seven
aze appointed by the Riksdag for a period of three years.' These Directors appoint a Governor,
who plays only a representative role, for a period of five years and elect among themselves a
Chairman on recommendation of the government.
2.2 United Kingdom
The Bank of England, established in 1694, was nationalized by the Bank of England Act of
194b.` This Act provides only intbrmation on the appointment of the Court of Directors and the
right to give instructions to the Bank of England. According to Article 4(1): 'The Treasury may
from time to time give such directions to the Bank as, after consultation with the Governor of the
Bank, they think necessazy in the public interest'.
At the introduction of the Act it was stressed that this right to give directions was not meant to
lead to '...any day-to-day interference by the Government or the Treasury with the ordinary work
of the Bank'.'"
It was the Banking Act of 1979 (revised in 1987) that formulated the responsibilities of the central
bank. The first task of the Bank of England is the (prudential) supervision of the banking system.
'Other activities of the Bank governed by statute include its note-issuing powers, its management
of the Exchange Equalisation Account on behalf of the Treasury, and its duties as banker to the
Government and as Government's agent in managing the National Debt'." Nevertheless,
monetary policy is regarded as a component of economic policy and therefore conducted by the
govetnment with the central bank as its major adviser.
The Bank of England is managed by the Court of Directors, which is made up of the Governor,
the Deputy Governor and sixteen Directors." All members are appointed by the Crown on the
recommendation of the Prime Minister. The term of office for the Governor and the Deputy3
Governor is fixed at five yeazs and for the Directors at four years. Four of these Directors are
full-time Executive Directors, the other twelve being part-time External Directors who represent
various sectors of society. The Governor is chairman of the Court of Directors, heads the day-to-
day operations by the Bank and plays the most important role in formulating advice or proposals
to the government.
2.3 France
Established in 1803, the Banque de France was nationalized under the Law of December 2, 1945,
which '...had been decided and passed in the perspective of a greater subordination of the Banque
de France to the State,...'." After discussions between its Governor and the Minister of Finance
regarding central bank independence," as a compromise the Statutes of the Banque de France
('Les Statuts de la Banque de France') of Ianuazy 3, 1973 were introduced. These Statutes define
in rather general terms the policy goals of the central bank and its relationship with the govern-
ment.15 According to Article 1 of the Statutes: '7ite Banque de France is the institution which, in
the framework of the economic and financial policy of the nation, receives from the State the
general mission of watching over the currency and credit'. Thus, the government determines the
economic and financial policy to which the monetary policy has been subordinated. Further,
Article 4 states that '...It contributes to the preparation and participates in the implementation of
the monetary policy that has been decided by the Government and with the assistance, within the
framework of its competence, of the Conseil National du Crédit...'. Although the central bank is
legally always subject to directions from the government, its Governor implements in consultation
with the Minister of Finance the monetary policy in practice.'"
The Banque de France is headed by the Governor, who is supported by two Deputy Governors.
Both the Governor and the Deputy Governors are appointed by the President of the Republic after
consultation with the Cabinet for an indefinite period, in practice 5-7 years, which makes their
position rather vulnerable."
2.4 The Netherlands
The Nederlandsche Bank was established in 1814 and nationalized in 1948. The statutory task of
the Dutch central bank regarding monetary policy is embedded in the Bank Act ('Bankwet') of
1948." Article 9(1) of this Act states that 'The Bank shall have as its duty to regulate the value
of the Dutch currency in such a way as will be most conductive to the nation's prosperity and
welfare, and in doing so seek to keep the value as stable as possible'. Further, Article 9(3) of the
Act reads: 'It shall supervise the credit system in pursuance of the Act on the Supervision of the
Credit Sys[em'. The latter Act gives the Bank the power to implement rules to be followed by
credit institutions in their lending. Thereby, the policy goal of the Nederlandsche Bank is to
stabilize the internal and external value of the currency, i.e. price level and exchange rate, but not
as a sole and independent objective."
The Bank Act also provides for a procedure if a conflict should arise between the government and
the Bank with respect to monetazy policy. According to Article 26 (1) of this Act: '[n cases, that
Our minister (of Finance) may consider it necessary for the purpose of coordinating monetary and
financial policy of the Government and the policy of the Bank, he may give, after consultation
with the Bank Council, the necessary directions to the Governing Board to attain that objectives'.4
AI[hough the Minister of Finance legally has the right
to give directions to the central bank, the application of this right is always considered by both
authorities as an ultimate remedy ('ultimum remedium') because of the very complicated
procedure to solve the conflict. The Minister of Finance has never exercised the right to give
directions until now. He and the Governing Board of the Bank are compelled to reach agreement
with each other and, thus, the independence of the Bank is sufficiently guaranteed by Article
26. ~
The Nederlandsche Bank is managed by the Governing Boazd (`Directie') being composed of the
President, the Secretary and presently three Executive Directors." They are nominated by a joint
meeting of the Governing Board and Supervisory Board ('Raad van Commissarissen') and
appointed by the Crown on the proposal of the Cabinet for a fixed period of seven years. In
practice, these nominations were always accepted by the Crown.
2.5 Belgium
Established in 1850, the National Bank of Belgium ('Nationale Bank van België') is owned half by
the state and half by the public. The legal base for the functioning of the Belgian central bank are
the Organic Law ('Organieke Wet') and the Statutes of 1939, which provide no specific objectives
for the Bank.~ Article 29 of the Organic Law states the following: 'The Minister of Finance
shall have the right to supervise all the operations of the Bank. He may object to the execution of
any measure which would be contrary to the Law, the Statutes or the interests of the State.
Therefore, the National Bank of Belgium cannot be considered as formally independent of the
government. itte Bank is forbidden to pursue targets conflicting with the general objectives of the
government. Nevertheless, the relationship between the central bank and government has changed,
in favour of more independence, by the reform of the money market and monetary policy instru-
ments which started on January, 29, 1991. As a consequence of this reform, the responsibility of
the central bank for monetary policy was more clearly defined and its touch with financial markets
on behalf of policy making improved.~
The Board of Directors ('Bestuurscomité') of the National Bank of Belgium is made up of the
Governor and three to six Directors of which one acts as Deputy Governor. iTte Governor and
Directors are appointed by the Crown for a fixed period of five and six years respectively. The
Board of Directors is chaired by the Governor and collectively responsible for the management of
the Bank and the formulation of monetary policy. ]t may change the discount rate and the rate for
advances in a case of emergency, but must report to the Council of Regency ('Regentenraad').
2.6 Germany
7Tte legal predecessors of the Deutsche Bundesbank were the Reichsbank, established in 1876, and
the Bank deutscher Lïnder, founded together with the introduction of the Deutsche Mazk by the
currency reform of 1948. The Deutsche Bundesbank was established by the Deutsche Bundesbank
Act ('Gesetz iiber die Deutsche Bundesbank') of 1957." Its main policy goals are provided for in
Article 3 of this Act: 'The Deutsche Bundesbank shall regulate the amount of money in circulation
and of credit supplied to the economy, using the monetary powers conferred on it by this Act,
with the aim of safeguarding the currency, and shall arrange for the handling by banks of
domestic and external payments'. Article 3 clearly reflects the special responsibility of the central5
bank for maintaining the internal and external value of the currency, i.e. price level and exchange
rate.' The relationship between the Bundesbank and the federal government is embedded in
Article 12 of the Act reading: 'Without prejudice to the performance of its functions, the Deutsche
Bundesbank shall be required to support the general economic policy of the Federal Government.
In exercising the powers conferred on it by this Act it shall be independent of instructions from
the Federal Government'. Thus, Article 12 guazantees the independence of the central bank
regazding monetary policy making.
The Central Bank Council ('Zentralbankrat') of the Deutsche Bundesbank is made up of the
Directorate ('Direktorium') and the Presidents of the Landeszentralbanken (main offices). The
Council determines monetary policy under chairmanship of the President or Deputy President of
the Bundesbank and meets every two weeks. The Directora[e, consisting of the President, Deputy
President and at most six (now five) other members, implements the decisions taken by the
Central Bank Council. The at most eight members of the Directorate are appointed by the
President of the Federal Republic on the nomination of the Federal Government, while the nine
Presidents of the Landeszentralbanken are appointed by him on the nomination of the Bundesrat
based on a proposal by the Government of the Land concerned, all after consultation of the
Central Bank Council. Both the members of the Directorate and the Presidents of the Landeszen-
tralbanken have a maximum term of office of eight yeazs which is usually realized. During this
term they cannot be removed from office on political grounds.
2.7 Japan
Established in 1882, the Bank of Japan was reorganized by the Bank of lapan Law of 1942~
According to Article I of this Law: 'The Bank of Japan has for its object the regulation of the
currency, the control and facilitation of credit and finance, and the maintenance and fostering of
the credit system, pursuant to the national policy, in order that the general economic activities of
the nation might adequately be enhanced'. The latter part of Article I may be taken to mean'...to
foster the stable development of the lapanese economy'.~' Thus, the main objectives of the Bank
aze to stabilize the value of the currency and to maintain orderly credit conditions. Regarding the
relationship between the central bank and government, Article 43 states thar. 'The competent
Minister (of Finance) may, if deemed particularly necessary for the attainment of the object of the
Bank of Japan, order the Bank to undertake any necessazy business, or order alterations in the By-
Laws as well as other necessary actions'. Although the Minister, formally, has the right to give
instructions, in practice this right has never been used as a result of the regular, informal contacts
between Bank management and government. The Bank of lapan derives its inFluence mainly from
guiding the financial markets (market leverage), which increases by the strengthening of market
forces. Thereby, the independence of the central bank has continued to grow."
The highest policy making body of the Bank of Japan is the Policy Board, consisting of the
Governor, two representatives from the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning Agency
(without voting right) and four other members. The Governor and the other members of the
Policy Board are appointed by the Cabinet for a period of five and four years respectively. Since
1969, the Governor has been chosen alternately from Bank officials and former Ministry of
Finance officials.~ The Governor conducts the operations of the Bank according to the directions
of the Policy Board and heads the Executive Board, which further includes two Deputy Governors6
(formerly one), at leas[ three Executive Directors and two Executive Auditors (now six and four
respectively), and a number of Counsellors. The Deputy Governors aze appointed by the Cabinet
for five yeazs, while the other members of the Executive Board by the Minister of Finance on
recommendation of the Governor for two to four years. Despite the fact that the Policy Board is,
from a legal point of view, the most important policy making body, the major responsibility for
formulating monetary policy resides with the Executive Board.~
2.8 Italy
The Banca d'Italia, established in 1893, is owned partially, through public financial institutions,
by the State. The legal base for its functioning are the Statutes ('Statuto della Banca d'Italia') of
1936, which provide no specific objectives for the central bank." The relationship between the
Banca d'Italia and the government is embedded in Article 20 of the Statutes stating that the Board
of Directors (`Comitato') is responsible only for the general management of the central bank and
not for monetary policy making. Furthermore, Article 25 reads: 'He (the Governor) shall make
proposals to the Minister of the Treasury concerning change in the discount rates and in the
interest rate on advances'. Obviously, the Governor prepares monetary policy and the Minister of
the Treasury has to approve it formally." The Statutes of 1936 were amended in 1947 by
providing the Banca d'Italia with supervision of the financial system and by the foundation of the
Interministerial Committee for Credit and Savings ('Comitato Interministeriale per il Credito e il
Risparmio' or CICR). According to Article I of the Decree of 1947, the CICR,'...whose duty it
shall be to supervise, at the highest level, the safeguazding of savings, the carrying on of credit
activities, and exchange matters', will give directives to the central bank for its operations. The
CIRC is made up of the most important ministers and the Governor, and chaired by the Minister
of the Treasury. In general, this committee determines the goals of monetary policy with the
Banca d'[talia in an advisory role. "
The Governor, having a personal responsibility for the implementation of monetary policy, is
appointed by the Board of Directors of the Banca d'Italia, for an indefinite term of office. The
Board of Directors consists of thirteen Directors, elected by the General Meeting of Shareholders
at the thirteen regional offices of the central bank for a fixed period of three years, the Governor
with a casting vote and a representative of the Ministry of the Treasury as an observer without
voting right. Although the appointment of Governor and Directors seems to be independent of the
government, Article 19 of the Statutes of 1936 states that: 'Appointments and dismissals must be
approved by decree of the President of the Republic on the proposal of the President of the
Council of Ministers in agreement with the Minister of the Treasury, the Council of Ministers
having been heard'.
2.9 Switzerland
Established in 1905, the Swiss National Bank ('Schweizerische Nationalbank') has enjoyed a high
degree of independence from the goverttment, reFlecting the deep-rooted distrust of the Swiss
public in centralized approaches to policy making.~ The main policy goals of the Swiss central
bank are provided for in Article 2(1) of the Federal Law on the Swiss National Bank ('Bundesge-
setz iiber die Schweizerische Nationalbank') of 1953: 'The principal task of the National Bankshall be to regulate the counvy's monetary circulation, facilitate payments vansactions, and
implement a credit and monetary policy serving the general interests of the country. It shall advise
the Federal authorities in monetazy matters. "' The central bank interprets this Article as a
mandate to achieve and to maintain a stable price level, which view is shared by the federal
goverttment and lazgely accepted by the public. The relationship between the Swiss National Bank
and the federal government ('Bundesrat') is one of legal and administrative sepazation. The
National Bank Law does not contain any provision giving the govertunent influence on monetary
policy making. In case of important policy decisions, both authorities should consult each other,
but mutual consent is not required.~
The Bank Committee ('Bankausschuss') is the principal policy making body of the Swiss National
Bank and has the right to participate in the setting of the Bank's official lending rates." Repre-
senting the various parts (cantons) of the country, this Bank Committee is made up of the
Chairman and the Deputy Chairman of the Bank Council ('Bankrat') and eight other members,
which aze appointed by the Bank Council for a fixed period of four years. Its Chairman, Deputy
Chairman and twenty-three other members are appointed by the federal government and the
remaining fifteen members are elected by the General Meeting of Shazeholders also for a period
of four years. Thus, only one-fifth of the Bank Committee and five-eighth of the Bank Council are
directly appointed by the federal government. Finally, the highest managing and executive
authority is the Directorate ('Direktorium') of the Bank, which is composed of three members
elected by the federal government, on recommendation of the Bank Council, for a fixed term of
six yeazs. The government also appoints among these three members a President and a Vice-
President, although there is a collective responsibility.
2.10 Australia
The Commonwealth Bank of Australia was established in 1911, initially as a trading bank. Steps
toward the acquisition of central banking powers were taken in the 1920s, especially in 1924.
Again, during the Great Depression of the 1930s, it began to acquire further central banking
responsibilities (e.g. for the exchange rate) and, under emergency powers in World War II,
established inter alia exchange control and a wide range of credit controls. These were continued
under the Banking Act 1945." Then in 1959, central banking functions were separated from
trading bank operations and a new Reserve Bank of Australia was established. The functions of
its Board are set out in Article 10 (2) of the Reserve Bank Act of 1959J9: 'It is the duty of the
Board, within the limits of its powers, to ensure that the mone[azy and banking policy of the Bank
is directed to the greatest advantage of the people of Australia and that the powers of the Bank
under this Act, the Banking Act 1959 and the regulations under that Act are exercised in such a
manner as, in the opinion of the Board, will best contribute to the stability of the curcency of
Australia, the maintenance of full employment in Australia and the economic prosperity and
welfare of the people in Australia'.
Thus, the threefold policy goal of the Reserve Bank also includes the fostering of economic
activity and employment. The Bank is completely subordinated to the Secretary of the Treasury,
being the final competent authority with respect to monetazy policy. In case of differences of
opinion between the central bank and the Treasury, Article 11 (2) states that '...the Treasurer and
the Boazd shall endeavour to reach agreement.'8
Furthermore, according to Article 50 (1) of the Banking Act of 1959 the Reserve Bank's setting of
rates on discounts and advances needs to be approved by the Treasury. So, the central bank is
more or less an agent of the government.
The Reserve Bank Board, responsible for implementing monetary policy, consists of the
Governor, the Deputy Governor, the Secretazy to the Treasury as an ex offico member and seven
other members. The government official on the Board has a voting right. The Governor and
Deputy Governor are appointed by the Governor-General (the executive branch of the federal
government) for a term of office, not ezceeding seven years. The seven other members comprise
at most two members who are officers of the Bank or Public Service, holding office '...during the
pleasure of the Governor-General'~, and at least five members selected by the Governor-Genera!
for a fixed period of five years. The Governor is chairman of the Board and has a casting vote.
2.11 United States
Established in 1913, the Federal Reserve System is a federal government authority comprising the
twelve Federal Reserve Banks and formerly (until 1935) the Federal Reserve Board as it main
policy making body. The legal base for its functioning was embedded in the Federal Reserve Act
of 1913." By the Banking Act of 1933 the Federal Reserve Board was granted more autonomy
vis-~-vis the Federal Reserve Banks and the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) was
created to make policy recommendations to the Board for conducting open market operation.s"
Further, the Banking Act of 1935 replaced the Federal Reserve Board by the Board of Governors
and strenghtened its position by removing the Secretary of the Treasury and the Treasurer from
the Board. The goals of the central bank regarding monetary policy were just clearly formulated
in section 2A of the 1977 amendment to the Act by stating thar. 'The Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System and the Federal Open Market Committee shall maintain long run growth
of the monetary and credit aggregates commensurate with the economy's long run potentíal to
increase production, so as to promote the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and
moderate long-term interest rates'. So, the Federal Reserve should aim both at price stability and
at economic activity and employment.
Furthermore, the Humphrey-Hawkins Act of 1978 was meant to improve the coordination of
economic and monetary policy between the federal government, Congress (parliament) and
Federal Reserve by reporting requirements for the central bank to Senate and House of Represen-
tatives at semi-annual hearings on the Board's and FOMC's objectives and plans with respect to
the growth of monetary and credit aggregates". In practice, both the Federal Reserve and the
government have a shared responsibility for monetary policy making.
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, acting as its highest policy making body,
is composed of seven members. These seven Governors are appointed by the President of the
United States for a fixed period of fourteen yeazs, with approval by the Senate. After a full term
of office the Governors may not be reappointed. The President appoints two members of the
Board of Governors as Chairman and Vice-Chairman for a fixed period of four yeazs.~ Political
influence on the appointment of the Board is minimalized by the long term of office, exceeding
more than three administrations, and the impossibility of dismíssa! on political grounds. Further-
more, the formulation of global monetary targets its carried out by the FOMC.
The FOMC is made up of the Board of Governors and five of the twelve Presidents of the Federal9
Reserve Banks. The President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, conducting open market
operations and exchange market interventions on behalf of the System, is an ex officio member of
the FOMC. The other four members are elected for a period of one year on a rotating basis.
2.12 Canada
The Bank of Canada, only established in I935, had its functioning originally based on the Bank of
Canada Act of 1934." Until 1967, this Act did not confine the threefold task of the central bank
regazding monetary policy making. However, in 1967 the relationship between the Bank of
Canada and the federal government was changed by the introduction of the Bank of Canada Act of
1967.~
This was caused by a major conFlict of the Governor with the Minister of Finance on the imple-
mentation of monetary policy. T'he Governor, wanting to conduct a restrictive policy, was forced
to resign. The Act of 1967 gave the Minister of Finance the right to promulgate instructions to the
Bank and, therefore, the ultimate authority for monetary policy. Article 14 (1) of the revised Act
states that: 'The Minister and the Governor shall consult regularly on monetary policy and on iu
relation to general economic policy'. Furthermore, Article 14 (2) continues: `If, notwithstanding
the consultations provided for in Subsection (1) there should emerge a difference of opinion
between the Minister and the Bank concerning the monetary policy to be followed, the Minister
may, after consultation with the Governor in Council (executive branch of government), give to
the Governor a written direction concerning monetazy policy, in specified terms, and the Bank
shall comply with such directive'. Although the Minister of Finance has, up to now, never used
his right to give instructions, this possibility has severely affected the independence of the central
bank after 1967.
The highest policy making body of the Bank of Canada is its Board of Directors, consisting of the
Governor, Deputy Governor, twelve Directors and the Deputy Minister of Finance as an ex
officio member without voting power." Both the Governor and the Deputy Governor are
appointed by the Directors, with the approval of the Governor in Council, for a fixed period of
seven years. The Minister of Finance appoints the twelve Directors, with the consent of the
Governor in Council, for a period of three years. Moreover, the Bank has an Executive Commit-
tee, which is composed of the Governor, Deputy Governor, [wo Directors and the Deputy
Minister of Finance and mainly responsible for the implementation of monetary policy.
3 IND[CES OF CENTRAL BANK INDEPEIIDENCE
3.1 Bade and Parkin's Courageous Attempt
A seminal paper concerning indices of central bank independence is Bade and Parkin (1988) (BP).
The paper investigates the cross-country relationship between monetary policies and the laws
which establish and delimit the powers of central banks. The study is empirical and deals with the
experience of twelve industrial countries (Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, the Netherlands the United Kingdom and the United States, Sweden and Switzerland)
during the floating exchange rate years 1972 to 1986~. They describe the central bank laws of
the twelve countries focusing on three features: (i)The relationship between central banks and go-10
vernment in the formulation of monetary policy, (ii) the procedures for appointing the boazd of
the central bank, and (iii) the financial and budgetary relations between the central bank and the
government. On the basis of features (i) and (ii) BP classify the twelve central banks according to
their degrees of policy independence. On the basis of feature (iii) they identify the degree of
financial independence from government. In this paper we focus on features (i) and (ii). BP's
description of financial and budgetary relations is discussed in Eijffinger and Schaling (1992a).
BP conclude that central banks which are independent both in policy-making and in the appoint-
ment of directors deliver a lower rate of inFlation than other central bank types.
On the basis of feature (i) the relationship between central banks and government in the formulati-
on of monetary policy" and feature (ii) the procedures for appointing and removing central bank
directors, BP construct their index of policy independence. The degree of policy independence is
determined using three criteria:
1 Is the bank the final policy authority?
~ Is there no government official (with or without voting power) on the bank boazd?
~ Are more than half of the board appointments made independent of the government?
The overall degree of policy independence is determined by a combination of attributes l-}. It
should be noticed that there is no non-azbitrazy way of aggregating them. However BP choose the
simplest one: Ihey simply summed Ihe attributes possessed by the central bank, meaning that each
attribute is weighted equally. Next,the central banks are ranked from 1(least independent) to 4
(most independent) depending on the number of attributes. For instance, the least independent
central bank is not in charge of monetary policy, has a government official on the board, and does
not make any board appointments independent of government. BP's ranking of the twelve central
banks can be found in the first column of table 1.
[INSERT TABLE l[
BP now turn to an investigation of the relationship between central bank types and monetazy
policy. In their analysis of monetary policy they focus on two aspects, its intlationary stance
(level) and the variability (variance) of inflation. The inflationary stance is measured by the
average rate of change of consumer prices (CPq~ Consider Table 1 which permits a direct
examination of the relationship between policy independence and intlation. BP think it striking that
the two most independent central banks, those of Germany and Switzerland, have delivered a
lower inflation rate than the intermediate central banks of Japan and the United States. On the
basis of these facts BP conclude that there is an association between the degree of central bank
policy independence and the average rate of inflation. By and large, the more independent the
central bank, the lower the inflation rate.
3.2 Alesina's Amendation
BP's work has been integrated in the positive theory of economic policy" by Alesina (1988,
1989). Alesina extends BP's sample of industrial countries to include New Zealand, Spain,
Denmark, Norway and Finland, by using institutional information provided by Masciandazo and
Tabellini (1988) and Fair (1980), respectively. Alesina likewise concludes that there is an inverse
relationship between the degree of independence of central banks and the average inflation rate11
(Alesina (1988), p. 41). Alesina's results are included in Table l.s' As can be easily seen from
this Table, the numerical values of the 'Alesina index of central bank independence' are identical
to those of the BP index of policy independence, except for the caze of Italy. Alesina haz the
following argument for classifying [taly as 1.5 rather than 2, as in BP:
"Bade and Parkin's classifications disregard institutional changes in the period considered. The
[talian Central Bank obtained more economic independence in 1982 (...). Given this change we
classified Italy as 1.5 rather than 2, as in Bade-Parkin."s' However, in Eijffinger and Schaling
(1992a) we show that the Alesina index is internally inconsistent.
3.3 The Broad Index of Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini
A recent index of central bank independence is that of Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991)
(GMT). They compare the monetary regimes of eighteen industrial countries (Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands,
New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States) during the
post-war period (I950-1989) by focusing on political and economic independence of the central
bank~. Like BP and Alesina, they find that in countries with more politically independent central
banks inflation is on average lower. According to GMT, political independence is the capacity to
choose the final goal of monetary policy, such as inflation or the level of economic activity. The
latter capacity is primarily determined by the following features:
(i) Relationships between central banks and government in the formulation of monetary policy
(ii) Procedures for appointing the board of the central bank
(iii) Formal responsibilities (policy goals) of the central bank with respect to monetary policy.
On the basis of features (i) -(iii) GMT construct their index of policy independence. The degree
ofpolicy independence is determined using eight criteria:ss
J: Is the governor not appointed by the government?
~ Is the governor appointed for more than five years?
~ Are all board members not appointed by the government? (Compare with BP ~)
4 ls the board appointed for more than five years?
~ Is there no mandatory participation of a government representative in the board? (Compare
with BP ~J
~ Is there no government approval of monetary policy required? (Compare with BP J
7 Are there statutory requirements that the bank pursues monetary stability among its goals?
~ Are there legal provisions that strengthen the bank's position in caze of conflicts with the
government?
The overall index of policy independence is determined by a combination of the attributes !-~.
Again, there is no non-arbitrary way of aggregating them. Like Bade and Parkin, GMT choose the
simplest one: they simply summed the attributes possessed by the central bank. Thus, each
attribute is weighted equally. Restricting attention to our sample, the twelve central banks are
ranked from 1(least independent) to 6(most independent). GMT's results can be summarized in
Table 2.~
(INSERT TABLE 2]12
From this table it can be seen that the GMT policy index is richer, i.e. more informative, than
the BP index of political independence. The GMT is more informative because more criteria aze
taken into account. BP use only three criteria, whilst GMT consider eight attributes. It can be
easily seen that GMT criteria ~ and ~ are identical to BP criteria ~ and j. One is tempted to make
a similar inference concerning GMT criterion ~. However, concerning the appointment of
directors GMT require all board members not to be appointed by the govertunent, whilst BP
require only 2 I1~21" of board members not to be appointed by the government. Therefore,
GMT's criterion ~, is more strict than BP's criterion ~. In order to compare GMT's findings with
these of BP, we restrict attention to attributes }, ~, and ~ of GMT. Since aggregation procedures
are identical, differences in numerical values of the BP and GMT indices are dependent on:
(a) differerences in the interpretation of the central bank laws with respect to GMT-attributes ~
and ~(or BP attributes j and 2)
(b) the difference between GMT attribute ~ and BP attribute ~.
We label differences (a) and (b) respectively interpretation effect and criterion effect. Thus
numerical differences depend on both these effects. The total effect is decomposed in Table 3.
[INSERT TABLE 3]
With respect to the interpretation effect, from Table 3 it can be seen that GMT and BP differ in
their interpretations of the central bank laws of Canada, France, Belgium, Japan, and the Nether-
lands. Canada, France, and Belgium are downgraded (-1), because contrary to BP GMT believe a
government representative to be present on the central bank boards. The Nederlandsche Bank is
upgraded (f 1), because unlike BP, GMT consider the central bank to be the final authority in
policy making. The differences are most striking in the case of )apan. The Bank of Japan is
severely downgraded (-2), because GMT believe that the government has an official on the bank
board, while according to BP there is no official. GMT are also of the opinion that the govern-
ment is the final authority in policy making, contradicting BP. We will return [o these differences
in Section 4. With respect to the criterion effect, by using a stricter version of BP ~, GMT change
the ranking of the Bundesbank, Banca d'Italia and the Swiss National Bank vis à vis BP. Both the
Bundesbank and the Swiss National Bank are downgraded (-I), whilst Banca d'Italia is upgraded
(t 1). It should be noticed that because the BP type 4 banks (Germany and Switzerland) do not
meet GMT criterion ~, they become intermediate banks. That is, in terms of political independen-
ce, they get the same status as the Federal Reserve (BP type 3). This is intuitively not very
appealing. Neither is the fact that Banca d'Italia is the only central bank that meets GMT criterion
~. Therefore, we conclude that by introducing a very strict criterion concerning the appointment
of directors, GMT severely bias the ranking of the central banks of Germany, Switzerland and
Italy.
4 TOWARDS A NEW INDEX OF POLICY INDEPENDENCE
4.1 A New Index of Policy Independence
Following GMT, we identify policy independence with the capacity of the central banks to choose13
the final goals of monetary policy. This capacity is primarily determined by the following
features:
(i) The procedures for appointing the boazd of the central bank
(ii) The relationship between central banks and government in the formulation of monetary policy
(iii) Formal responsibilities (policy goals) of the central bank with respect to monetary policy.
On the basis of features (i) -(iii) we construct our own index, which is called the Eijffinger-
Schaling (ES) index of policy independence. The degree of policy independence is determined
using three criteria:
1 Is the bank the sole final policy authority (b), is this authority not entrusted to the central
bank alone (blg), or is it entrusted completely to the government (g)?
2. Is there no government official (with or without voting power) on the bank board?
~ Are more than half of the board appointments made independent of the government?"
Now we can distinguish 3 x 2 x 2- 12 potential policy types. This is summarized in Table 4.
[INSERT TABLE 4]
The first four types do not exis[. For a central bank being itself in chazge of monetary policy and
also having a government official on its board (types (c) and (d)) does not occur in reality.
Besides, there is no central bank that in spite of its not being in charge of monetary policy, makes
some board appointments independent of the government. Therefore, types (a) and (b) do not
exist. From our examination of central bank laws in Section 2, it follows that this argument
includes the 'twin-authority' central banks, i.e. the central banks which have some but incomplete
policy authority (blg). That is, a'twin-authority' central bank that has a government officia! on its
board (type e) does not exist. Finally, there is no twin-authority bank that makes some board
appointments independent of the government. Consequently potential types (f) and (g) do not exist
either. So, only the bottom part of Table 5 is relevant for the ES index of policy independence.
The overall degree of policy independence is determined by a combination of anributes ES I-~.
Contrary to BP and GMT, we do not weigh each attribute equally. This becomes clear if we take
a look at ES j.. If policy making is exclusively entrusted to the central bank a country gets two
asterisks. If it is not exclusively entrusted to the central it gets one asterisk. Finally, if the
government is the sole authority in policy making it gets zero asterisks. Therefore, regarding our
first criterion the maximum amount of asterisks is higher (two) than that with respect to criteria
ES ~ and ~(one). This means that criterion ~ has a weight of 214, two times the weight of the
other criteria (Il4). Hence, our index is asymmetrical in the sense that anributes are not weighted
equally. We will return to this issue later. Thus, the five remaining (existíng) central bank types
are ranked from 1(least independent) to 5(most independent) according to the number of
asterisks. Our findings are summarized in Table 5. In order to facilitate comparison with the
literature we ínclude BP's results.
[INSERT TABLE 5]
4.2 Comparison with the Literature
Again, differences in numerical values are dependent on both interpretation- and criterion effects.14
In order to isolate the criterion effect we construct 'BP Asymmetrical Policy Types' (BPA). The
latter types result when BP outcomes are entered into our (asymmetrical) aggregation procedure.
For instance, consider Japan. According to BP the bank is the final policy authority. In terms of
our aggregation procedure this means two asterisks, rather than one. Therefore as a consequence
of the higher relative weight attached to this criterion the Bank of Japan becomes BP (asymmetri-
cal) type 4. Now the total difference between ES and BP can be decomposed according to the
following formula:
(1) ES - BP - (ES - BPA) f (BPA - BP)
Where the first term on the right hand side is the interpretation effect and the second term is the
criterion effect. From Table 5 it follows that the interpretation etfects (see column (d)) concern
Belgium, Canada, Japan, The Netherlands and the United States. The National Bank of Belgium is
upgraded (t I), because we regard it a twin-authority (blg) rather than a government dominated
institution (g). This is because the bank gained more independence by the reform of the money
market and monetary instruments in January 1991 (see Section 1). The Bank of Canada is
downgraded (-I) because, contrary to BP, we find a government official on the boazd, namely the
Deputy Minister of Finance (without voting power). The Bank of ]apan is downgraded (-1)
because unlike BP we consider it to be a twin-authority (blg) rather than a bank dominated (b)
institution. The Nederlandsche Bank is upgraded (t2), because we consider it independent in
policy making (b) rather than dependent (g) as a consequence of the only formal right of the
Minister of Finance to give directions to the Bank. Finally, the Federal Reserve System is
downgraded because unlike BP (b), we consider it a twin-authority institution (blg). In Table 6
our findings are confronted with GMT's.
[INSERT TABLE 6~
Also, the total difference between ES and GMT may be decomposed, taking the following
furmula:
(2) ES - GMT - (ES - BP) t (BP - GMT)
Where the first term on the right hand side is decomposed in Table 6 and the second term is
decomposed in Table 5.
4.3 Evaluation
Our main findings regarding the existing indices can be summarized as follows. GMT and BP
differ in their interpretations of the central bank laws of Canada, France, Belgium, Japan, and the
Netherlands. These differences refer to both the presence of government officials on the bank
boazd, and the final authority in policy making. Also, by using a very strict criterion with respect
to the appointment of directors GMT severely bias the ranking of the Bundesbank, Banca d'Italia
and the Swiss National Bank vis à vis that by Bade and Parkin. It is important to notice that the
GMT index of policy independence is based on the features:
(i) The relationship between central banks and government in the formulation of monetazy policy
(ii) The procedures for appointing the board of the central bank
(iii) Formal responsibilities (policy goals) of the central bank with respect to monetary policy.
However, GMT separately assess features (i) and (iii). For example, the following conclusions cani5
be drawn considering the Reserve Bank of Australia. From Table 2 it follows that according to
GMT the Reserve Bank Act of 1959 contains provisions that the central bank pursues monetary
stability (GMT ~ among its goals. On the other hand, according to Table 2, the government is
the final policy authority (GMT ~). Therefore, GMT assess the contents of the final goals of
monetary policy (GMT ~ irrespective of the capacity to choose these goals (GMT ~. By their
sepazate assessment GMT allow for a one for one trade-off between the capacity to pursue a
monetary policy goal and the contents of such a goal. That is, restricting attention to GMT ~ and
7, a subservient central bank with provisions for monetazy stability is as independent as a
autonomous central bank without these provisions. Of course, this trade~ff is a natural conse-
quence of symmetrical weighting. Like GMT, the ES index of policy independence is based on
features (i) -(iii). However, we want to avoid the mentioned trade-off phenomenon. Therefore
feature (i) the final authority in policy making is assessed in conjunction with feature (iii) the
policy goals of monetary policy. That is, the extent to which a central bank is regazded as the sole
policy authority (ES !), also depends on the presence of statutory requirements concerning
monetary stability. Hence, we think a double weight 2~4 vs ll4) with respect to the first criterion
seems to be justified. In forthcoming research (Eijffinger and Schaling ( 1992b)) we use the ES
index of policy independence to test the theoretical implications of central bank independence in a
single-stage (one shot) Phillips curve monetary policy game.
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NOTES
1. For an interesting survey of central banking in emerging market-oriented economies see
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City (1990).
2. Case studies are Eizenga (1987, 1990, 1991) and Eijffinger (1992).
3. We focus on internal monetary policy, i.e. we take no account of the relations of governments
and central banks in the conduct of exchange rate policy. We leave this for further research.
4. See: Aufricht (1967), pp. 663~71. The last revision of this Act was made in 1988.
5. From: Skanland (1984), p. 16.
6. In: Sveriges Riksbank, Credit and Foreign Exchange, 1990.
7. See: Fair (1979), p. 40.
8. See: Sveriges Riksbank, Annual Report 1990, p. 5.
9. See: Aufricht (1967), pp. 185-192.
10. From: Eizenga (1991), p. 4.
11. See: Caincross (1988), p. 68.
12. According to Article 2(1) of the Bank of England Act of 1946.
13. The Law of December 2, 1945 is given by: Aufricht (1967), pp. 199-210.
14. See: Bouvier (1988), pp. 96-97.
15. In: Banque de France, La Banque de France et la Monnaie, Paris, 1986, pp. 149-157.
16. See: Eizenga (1990), pp. 2,12.
l7. From: Skanland (1984), p. 13.
l8. This Act is given in: Wetten Binnenlands Geldwezen, Zwolle, 1979, pp. 5-27. See also:
Eizenga (1983), p. 10.
19. See Eizenga (1987), p. 12.
20. From: Eizenga (1987), pp. 13-14.
2l. Article 22 of the Bank Act provides the possibility to appoint at most five Executive
Directors. The Governing Board has a collective responsibility for the Bank's management.
22. The Organic Law and Statutes are revised on ]anuary 2 and 23, 1991. See: Belgisch
Staatsblad, ]anuary, 25 and 29, 1991.
23. See: Hervorming van het monetair beleidsinstrumentarium, azpecten en documenten,
Belgische Vereniging van Banken, No. 114 1991, p.25.
24. See; The Deutsche Bundesbank - Its monetary policy instruments and functions, Deutsche
BundesbankSpecial Series, No. 7, 2nd edition, Frankfurt-am-Main, Oktober 1987, pp. 105-
130.
25. For an interpretation: Eizenga (1987), pp. 2-12.
26. This Law was amended in 1949 to found the Policy Board, the highest policy making body of
the Bank. See: Aufricht (1961), pp. 423~48.
27. An interpretation is given by: Suzuki (I987), pp. 305-312.
28. For an analysis of this process: Eijffinger and Van Rixtel (1992), p. 24.i8
29. See also: The Economist, Central Banks: America v. lapan - The rewards of independence,
]anuazy, 25, 1992, p. 22.
30. The Policy Boazd formally adopts the decisions of the Executive Board. See: Cargill (1989),
PP. 27-28.
31. See: Aufricht (1967), pp. 421-440.
32. Very recently, the Italian parliament approved a bill to give the central bank full authority
regarding discount policy.
33. See: Nazdozzi (1988), p. 179.
34. From: Rich (1989), p. 1.
35. See: Aufricht (1967), pp. 705-724.
36. See also: Skanland (1984), p. 22.
37. According to Rich (1989), however, this right '...is not a significant as it may seem at first
sight because these rates no longer constitute important policy instruments in Switzerland' (p.
6).
38. See Wilson (1952), pp. 33-99.
39. The Reserve Bank Act of 1959 is given by: Aufricht (1961), pp. 53-71.
40. According to Article 14 (3) of the Reserve Bank Act of 1959.
41. See also: Boazd of Governors, The Federal Reserve System; Purposes and Functions,
Washington, D.C., 1984. An interpretation can be found in: Cargill (1989), pp. 21-32.
42. For the creation of the FOMC: Akhtar and Howe (1991), p. 364.
43. According to Eizenga (1983) `...this Act does not derogate from the independence of the FED
with regazd to its policies' (p. 6). He calls it 'independent within the government' (pp. 7-9).
44. From: Krooss and Samuelson (1969), pp. 2913-2914.
45. See: Aufricht (1961), pp. 89-I05.
46. In: The Revised Statutes of Canada, 1970, VoL 1, Ottawa, 1970.
47. Notice that the government official in the Board of Governors of the Reserve Bank of
Australia, on the contrary, has voting power.
48. Bade and Parkin (1988) (p. 18) point out that a commitment to a fixed exchange rate leaves
monetary policy with the task of determining the stock of foreign reserves. Therefore, they
think it pointless to look to the effects of central bank laws on monetary policy in a fixed
exchange rate era.
49. BP's results concerning both the relationship between the central bank and the govertunent in
monetary policy making and the procedures for appointing and removing central bank
directors aze extensively discussed in Eijffinger and Schaling (1992a), pp. 18-20.
50. In this paper we focus on the level of inflation. For a detailed discussion about central
bank independence and the variance of inflation see Eijffinger and Schaling (1992b).
51. Alesina supports the rational partisan theory, a theory that combines Hibbs' (1977) partisan
theory with rational expectations macroeconomic theory.
52. For ease of comparison we focus on the BP sample, skipping New Zealand, Spain, Den-
mark, Norway and Finland.
53. See: Alesina (1988), p. 42. However, Tabellini (1988), p. 96 states this change to have taken
place in the summer of 1981.
54. According to Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini, economic independence is the capacity to
choose the instruments of monetary policy. Their treatment of economic independence is
extetuively discussed in Eijffinger and Schaling (1992a).
55. To facilitate compazison corresponding BP criteria are given in italics.
56. Again, for ease of comparison we focus on the BP sample, skipping Austria, Denmazk,
Greece, Ireland, New Zealand, Portugal and Spain.
57. The threshold for meeting BP's criterion ~ is the composition of the Central Bank Council of
the Bundesbank.
58. Following BP this criterion is operationalized as: proportion of inembers t EQI appointed
directly or indirectly by the government 2 50 90.Average Inflation
Grouped According to Central Bank Policy Type:
Flexible Exchange Rate Period 1972-1986
Bade Par- Inflation Rank Alesina Index




Australia l 9.9 (10) I
Belgium 2 7.1 (6) 2
Canada 7.9 (7)
France 9.5 (9)
Italy 14.0 (12) 1.5




lapan 3 6.6 (4) 3
United 6.9 (5)
States
Germany 4 4.3 (1) 4











1 2 ~ 4 5 6 7 8 Q
Australia ~ . . 3
Belgium ~ 1
Canada ' ~ rt . 4
France k fi 2
Germany ~ w ~ ~ . . 6
ftaly ~ ~ ~ ~ 4
Japan 'K i
Nether- ~ ~ ~ } w . 6
lands ~ ~ ~ ~ . 5
Switzer- ~ i
land ~ ~ ~ . . 5
U.K. - - - - - - - -
U.S.
Sweden
I- Govemor not appointexl Ay government
2- Govemor appointed for ~ 5 years
3- All the Board nut appuinted by governrttent
4- Board appointed for 7 5 years
5- No mandatory partkipation of government representative in the Board
6- No government approval of monetary poGcy formulation is requirrd
7- Statuwry requirements that central bank pursues monetary stability among its gcwls
8- lxgal provisions Ihat strenghtened the cenlral bank position in conflicts with the government are present










(See note (a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
below)
Australia l 1
Belgium I 2 -1 -1
Canada I 2 -1 -1
France I 2 -1 -i
Germany 3 4 -1 -1
Italy 3 2 f 1 t I
lapan I 3 -2 -2
Netherlands 3 2 f 1 f 1




(a) (Number of asterisks in columns ~, ~ and ~ of Table 2) f l.
(b) See Table 1
(c) (Number of asterisks in columns 5 and 6 of Table 2 f number of asterisks in column ~ of Table 1
from Eijffinger and Schaling (1992a)) f I- BP Policy Type.
(d) (Number of asterisks in columns I and 2 of Table 1 from Eijffinger and Schaling (1992a) f number of
asterisks in column 3 of Table 2) t I- BP Policy Type.































- (g) - ' (a) no -
- (g) ' ' (b) no -
.. (b) - . (~) no
.. (b) - - (d) no
' (b~g) - - (e) no -
' (blg) ~ ~ (~ no -
` (blg) - ` (8) no -
- (8) - - (h) yes I
- (g) ' - (i) yes 2
' (b~g) ~ - lj) yes 3
.. (b) . - (k) yes 4


















(See note (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (n
below)
Australia l I I 0 0 0
Belgium 3 2 2 f 1 0 f 1
Canada I 2 2 - I 0 - I
France 2 2 2 0 0 0
Germany 5 4 5 0 i-1 t I
Italy 2 2 2 0 0 0
lapan 3 3 4 -I t 1 0
Netherlands 4 2 2 f2 0 f2
Switzerland 5 4 5 0 f I f I
VK 2 2 2 0 0 0
US 3 3 4 -1 f 1 0
Sweden 2 2 2 0 0 0
(a) (Number of asterisks in columns l, 2 and ~ of Table 4) f I.
(b) See Table 1
(c) BP Asymmetrical Policy Types; BP types if BP I has two times the weight of BP 2 and ~. (b -").
(d) ES -I- BPA.
(e) BPA. -I- BP.







(See note (a) (b) (c) (d)
below)
Australia l 1 0 0 0
Belgium 3 1 f I f 1 f2
Canada I 1 -1 f 1 p
France 2 I p ~ 1 ~ 1
Germany 5 3 t 1 f 1 t2
Italy 2 3 0 -1 -1
Japan 3 1 p f2 f2
Netherlands 4 3 f2 -1 tl
Switzerland 5 3 f I f I f2
VK 2 2 0 0 0
US 3 3 0 0 0
Sweden 2 - 0 - -
(a) See Table 3.
(b) See column (~ Table 5.
(c) See column (e) Table 3(signs must be reversed)
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